The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, Homelessness and Moral Hazard

Prof. Michel Vols published new research on the right to housing as laid down in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.

Over 75 percent of the jurisprudence under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights (OP-ICESCR) deals with the right to housing as laid down in Article 11 of the ICESCR. State parties should provide adequate alternative housing after evictions. However, this far-reaching requirement may lead to moral hazard. The study presents a new understanding of the adverse effects of extensive protection, such as universal eviction protection, which may cause strategic defaults. The study suggests that a restrictive and reasonable interpretation of Article 11 ICESCR may reduce the incentive for defaults but may not prevent land-grabbing or squatting.

This paper is titled ‘The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, Homelessness and Moral Hazard: The Alternative Adequate Housing Requirement in the CESCR’s Jurisprudence – an Incentive Not to Pay for Housing?‘ It is open access and can be found in the International Human Rights Law Review.